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SELLER'S DAMAGES FOLLOWING RESALE
UNDER ARTICLE TWO OF THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
Robert ]. Nordstrom*
HE seller's right to resell contracted-for goods following a breach
by the buyer1 is set forth in section 2-706 of the Uniform Commercial Code (Code). 2 That section also contains a statement of the
conditions placed upon the exercise of that right3 and provides the
measure of recovery if the resale is made "in good faith and in a
commercially reasonable manner": 4

T

[T]he seller may recover the difference between the resale price and
the contract price together with any incidental damages allowed
under the provisions of this Article (Section 2-710), but less expenses
saved in consequence of the buyer's breach.6

In most of the cases in which the seller has resold, this section can
be applied without difficulty. There are, however, some situations in
which judicial interpretation will be needed in order to reach a desired result. The purpose of this article is to examine the measure
of damages provided in section 2-706 as applied both to the usual
and to the not-so-usual cases.
Legal principles have a deceptive quality of sounding extremely
• Professor of Law, Ohio State University. A.B. 1948, Western Michigan University; J.D. 1949, University of Michigan. Editorial Board, Vol. 47, Michigan Law
Review.-Ed.
I. The phrase "breach by the buyer" may be too broad. The first sentence of § 2-706
of the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE [hereinafter cited as U.C.C.] is: "Under the conditions
stated in Section 2•703 on seller's remedies, the seller may resell the goods concerned
or the undelivered balance therof." Sction 2-703 lists four conditions under which the
aggrieved seller may proceed under § 2-706: "Where the buyer wrongfully rejects or
revokes acceptance of goods or fails to make a payment due on or before delivery or
repudiates with respect to a part or the whole • • • .'' Therefore, there may be breaches
by a buyer which do not fall within the four conditions listed in § 2-703; if a particular
case involves one of these non-covered breaches, § 2-706 should not be available to the
seller.
2. All references to the Uniform Commercial Code are to the 1962 Official Text.
3. For example, the resale must be "in good faith and in a commercially reasonable
manner"; "every aspect of the sale including the method, manner, time, place and terms
must be commercially reasonable"; the resale "must be reasonably identified as referring to the broken contract"; if resale is by private sale, the seller must give the buyer
"reasonable notification of his intention to resell"; and if resale is by public sale,
several conditions must be met including (in some cases) "reasonable notice of the
time and place of the resale." U.C.C. §§ 2-706(1), (2), (3), &: (4). In addition, the seller's
right to identify goods to the contract is detailed in § 2-704.
4. Although the only stated conditions on the right of seller to resell and to recover
resale damages are those listed in the text, the other conditions of § 2-706, see note 3
supra, will probably be read into the right through the "good faith and commercially
reasonable manner" requirements.
5. u.c.c. § 2-706(1).
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fair as long as they are discussed in the abstract. When considered
in relation to specific cases, however, they sometimes become of
much more doubtful wisdom. Therefore, this article will proceed
from a basic fact pattern to which variations designed to emphasize
some of the difficulties presented by the damage formula of section
2-706 will be added.

Basic Fact Pattern. Seller agreed to sell and Buyer to buy
"goods"-as that term is defined in section 2-105. The agreedupon price was $5,000. Buyer committed one of the acts listed in
section 2-703 (wrongfully rejected or revoked acceptance of the
goods, failed to make a payment due on or before delivery, or
repudiated) and Seller elected to resell under the terms of section
2-706. Seller complied with the requirements of that section and
is now requesting that damages be computed under the abovequoted formula.
CASE ONE

Buyer had paid nothing on the purchase price. Seller obtained
only $4,000 on resale and incurred $300 in incidental damages,
but saved no expenses because of Buyer's breach.
This is a case quickly solved by section 2-706. The resale price
was $1,000 less than the contract price; thus, Seller's recovery begins
at $1,000. Had Seller incurred no incidental damages, that would
have been the extent of his award. However, the language of section
2-706(1) makes it clear that Seller will recover his loss on resale
($1,000) "together with" the incidental damages ($300). 6 Seller's total
recovery will therefore be $1,300, and he will have been placed in
the same financial position in which he would have been had there
been no breach; the goods have been sold and Seller has received
a net price of $5,000.7
6. U.C.C. § 2-710. Seller's Incidental Damages.
Incidental damages to an aggrieved seller include any commercially reasonable
charges, expenses or commissions incurred in stopping delivery, in the transportation, care and custody of goods after the buyer's breach, in connection with
return or resale of the goods or otherwise resulting from the breach.
7. A pre-Code case is Wickman v. Opper, 188 Cal. App. 2d 129, IO Cal. Rptr. 291
(1961). A seller who is in the business of selling the contracted-for goods and who can
supply all reasonable demand for the product is generally not placed in the same
financial position by§ 2-706's formula as he would have been with buyer's performance.
Such a seller could have made all sales (including the sale to the defaulting buyer), and
the sale to the defaulting buyer would have provided additional revenue with which to
pay his overhead and to return a net profit to the seller. Thus, one sale has been lost
and is not compensated by the second sale which, by hypothesis, could have been made
anyway. Such a seller should not ordinarily use § 2-706. His remedy is provided in
§ 2-708(2). See Jessup & Moore Paper Co. v. Bryant Paper Co., 297 Pa. 483, 147 Atl. 519
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CAsE Two

Buyer had paid nothing on the purchase price. Seller was fortunate and obtained $6,000 on resale, incurring no incidental
damages and saving no expenses in consequence of Buyer's
breach.
This case represents one of the not-so-usual situations mentioned
above. Seller was able to sell the goods at a price in excess of the
Buyer-Seller contract price, which indicates that Buyer probably had
a profitable contract. Buyers in such a situation do not generally
breach; yet case law does not need to be searched long to discover
fact patterns presenting precisely this type of circumstance.8 On occasion buyers with profitable contracts have no alternative but to
default; on other occasions there is a genuine dispute as to which
party is in default and it is not until the court reaches its decision
that the buyer knows that he was the breaching party.9 In any event,
legal rules must have sufficient :flexibility to solve even the not-sousual transaction.
The Code's answer to this case is found in section 2-706(6):
"The seller is not accountable to the buyer for any profit made on
any resale." 10 Since the resale price exceeded the contract price,
Seller would not be entitled to any recovery under section 2-706(1),
but as was just noted, Seller has no duty to account to Buyer for the
$1,000 received above the contract price. Thus, under the Code, as
under prior law, the buyer's default-however unintentional-bars
him (the buyer) from any protection of his expected profit, although
(1929). Compare A. Lenobel, Inc. v. Senif, 252 App. Div. 533, 300 N.Y. Supp. 226 (1937).
See generally Comment, Lost Profits as Contract Damages: Problems of Proof and Limitations on Recovery, 65 YALE L.J. 992 (1956). Pre-Code cases are collected in Annot., 24
A.L.R.2d 1008 (1952); cf. Peters, Remedies for Breach of Contracts Relating to the Sale
of Goods Under the Uniform Commercial Code: A Roadmap for Article Two, 73 YALE
L.J. 199, 275-77 (1963).
8. Amtorg Trading Corp. v. Miehle Printing Press&: Mfg. Co., 206 F.2d 103 (2d Cir.
1953), discussed in text accompanying notes 15-17 infra, is such a case. Otber cases are
discussed in 3 WILLISroN, SALES §§ 579c, 599m (rev. ed. 1948); Corman, Restitution for
Benefits Conferred by Party in Default Under Sales Contract, 34 TEXAS L. REv. 582, 592
(1956); cases are collected in Annot., 11 A.L.R.2d 701 (1950).
9. Thach v. Durham, 120 Colo. 253, 208 P .2d 1159 (1949), may be such a case.
10. The Code provision quoted in tbe text continues tbe rule under § 60(1) of tbe
Uniform Sales Act, which read:
He [an unpaid seller] shall not tbereafter be liable to tbe original buyer upon tbe
contract to sell or tbe sale or for any profit made by such resale, but may recover
from tbe buyer damages for any loss occasioned by tbe breach of tbe contract or
tbe sale.
Under the Code, "A person in the position of a seller ••. or a buyer who has rightfully
rejected or justifiably revoked acceptance must account for any excess over tbe amount
of his security interest ••••" U.C.C. § 2-706(6); see U.C.C. §§ 2-707 &: -711(3); cf. U.C.C.
§ 9-504.
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the reasons that support the seller's right to retain the $1,000, beyond some feeling of what the answer ought to be,11 are difficult to
discover.
CAsE THREE
Buyer had paid nothing on the purchase price. Seller was fortunate and received $6,000 on resale but incurred $300 in incidental damages, saving no expenses in consequence of Buyer's
breach.
The problem presented by this case centers on whether Seller is
entitled to the incidental damages which he incurred even though
he received a net benefit of $700 following the breach. The Code
does not provide a specific answer. Applying the formula incorporated in section 2-706(1), the following argument can be made that
Seller is entitled to damages of $300 from Buyer: Section 2-706(1)
provides that a seller recovers the loss on resale (in this case it
would be zero) "together with" his incidental damages ($300); 12 by
adding these two sums-as section 2-706(1) assumes-Seller's recovery would be the amount of his incidental damages. This argument
might be strengthened by the statement in section 2-706(6) that the
seller need not account to the buyer for any profit made on the
resale. Allowing Buyer to reduce the incidental damages by the profit
Seller made on resale would be an effective method of requiring Seller
to account to Buyer for that profit, contrary to the mandate of the
Code. Therefore, since Buyer is not entitled to any of the $1,000
profit Seller made on this resale, Buyer is liable-according to this
argument-for the full amount of incidental damages.
There is, however, another way to read the Code. The statement
in section 2-706(6) that a seller need not account to the buyer for
any profit made on the resale may not refer to gross profits (as was
assumed in the prior paragraph), but rather to the net profits of the
sale (that is, the total amount received from the second buyer less
the section 2-710 incidental expenses incurred by Seller). If the Code
is referring to net profits, a seller has suffered no incidental damages
until his expenses following breach exceed the amount by which the
the resale price was greater than the contract price. Thus, Seller
would have suffered no incidental damages in Case Three and would
be entitled only to nominal damages.
The difficulty lies in the fact that the Code makes either of the
above interpretations plausible. Nevertheless, the general philosophy
11. 3 WILLISTON, SALES § 553 (rev. ed. 1948).
12. The Code language is set out in the text accompanying note 5 supra.
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of the Code tends toward the second. Article Two remedies seek to
put the non-defaulting (the Code's word is "aggrieved") party in the
same financial position he would have been in had there been no
default; 13 they do not aim at placing him in a better position. The
Code expresses this philosophy in these words:
The remedies provided by this Act shall be liberally administered
to the end that the aggrieved party may be put in as good a position
as if the other party had fully performed but neither consequential
or special nor penal damages may be had except as specifically provided in this Act or by other rule of law.14
Awarding Seller $300 incidental damages in Case Three puts him in
a better financial position than he would have been in had Buyer
performed. It is true that the express language of the Code which
allows Seller to keep the excess of the resale price over the contract
price also has this effect. There is, however, no need to accept a construction which further increases the total profit to Seller by giving
him damages for the expenses which contributed at least in part to
the receipt of that excess.
Amtorg Trading Corp. v. Miehle Printing Press & Mfg. Co.15
should be helpful to a court presented with a fact pattern similar to
Case Three. In Amtorg the buyer had prepaid nearly $90,000 on a
contract price of over $350,000. Partial deliveries reduced the balance due by twenty-five per cent and the prepayment to just under
$60,000. The buyer defaulted and the seller was able to resell the
goods (printing presses) for $18,765 more than the contract price.
The buyer sued the seller for the down payment plus the $18,765
profit. The court found a national policy (arising out of the application of a federal statute to the facts of the case) 16 favoring restitution in spite of the fact that the plaintiff (buyer) was in default. The
court concluded:
Plaintiff [buyer] is therefore entitled to restitution of its payments beyond and above any injury suffered by defendant [seller].
This would not include the additional profit on resale obtained by
defendant; no reason is apparent why defendant should not have
the advantage it has been able to reap by this fortunate and frugal
act. It appears further that defendant by counterclaim asserted
certain offsets by way of expenses on its resale. If actually its expenses did eat up its apparent profits, it may deduct the amount of
the excess from the prepayment before its refunding. . . . The case
13.
14.
15.
16.

Remedies expressing this philosophy are indexed in U.C.C. §§ 2·703 &: -711.
U.C.C. § 1·106(1). See also U.C.C. §§ 2-703, comment 4; -711, comment 3.
206 F.2d 103 (2d Cir. 1953).
See Note, 67 HARv. L. REY. 347 (1953).
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must be remanded for the determination of this issue and for entry
of a judgment for plaintiff for refund of the prepayment, subject to
deduction of any expenses proven by defendant if and only so far as
they may exceed its profit of $18,765.17
Even though Amtorg involved a suit by a defaulting buyer for
restitution, its holding on the question of the seller's expenses on
resale should also apply to a suit instituted by the seller. Thus, the
holding of Amtorg and the general philosophy of the Code against
forfeitures compel a construction of section 2-706 which allows a
seller to recover incidental damages only if they exceed any gross
profit on resale. Hence, Seller in Case Three should be awarded no
recovery against Buyer.
CASE FOUR

Prior to breach Buyer prepaid $500 on the $5,000 purchase
price; thus, at the time of breach Buyer owed Seller only $4,500
for the goods. Following breach Seller resold the goods for
$4,500-incurring no incidental damages and saving no expenses because of Buyer's breach.
Section 2-706's formula begins by allowing a seller to recover the
difference between the resale price ($4,500) and the contract price
($5,000).18 Therefore, under a literal application of section 2-706(1),
Seller would be awarded a $500 recovery against Buyer which, when
added to the $5,000 already received ($500 from Buyer's prepayment
and $4,500 on resale), would net Seller a total of $5,500 on a $5,000
contract.
To the common-law Ia-wyer, such a result is unthinkable. Seller
has received the contract price through the down payment and the
proceeds of the resale, and has incurred no expenses. He is, therefore, not "damaged" as that term is used in a system of law which
seeks to compensate the non-defaulting party rather than penalize
the defaulter. Thus both the common law and the stated philosophy
of the Code (to put the aggrieved party in as good a position as if
the defaulter had performed)19 are contrary to such a literal application of section 2-706's formula to the facts of Case Four.
17. 206 F.2d at 108. (Emphasis added.)
18. This portion of the Code is quoted in the text accompanying note 5 supra.
19. U.C.C. § 1·106(1). This section requires that Code remedies be "liberally administered" so that the aggrieved party will be put in "as good a position as if the other
party bad fully performed." To the extent that damages are the chosen remedy, the
phrase "as good a position" undoubtedly refers to the financial position of the aggrieved
party. Liberal administration of remedies will often require judicial construction which
expands recovery from the language of the Code. There is, however, no reason why
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The recovery in this case can be brought in line with the compensation principle by a judicial construction of section 2-706(1)
which inserts the word "unpaid" immediately preceding the word
"contract," so that the formula allows a seller to recover the difference between the resale price and the unpaid contract price. Inserting the word "unpaid" can be justified on the basis that the Uniform
Commercial Code is a code, not a single statute. The Code expresses
several ascertainable philosophies regarding commercial transactions;
with respect to damages, it generally promotes compensation of the
aggrieved party and this compensation philosophy ought to be applied to specific cases in the same manner as the theory of commonlaw decisions is used to decide the obligations of parties in situations
not falling within the terms of the particular common-law rule
drawn from those decisions. Moreover, the drafters of section 2-706
probably had in mind the case in which the entire contract price
was still owed by the buyer-cases like Case One.20 Surely the inadvertent omission of a word or a phrase in a specific rule that was designed to give direction in one type of case should not prevent a
court from adding that word or phrase for an atypical case when
such an addition promotes the philosophy of the Code.
That the omission of "unpaid" was inadvertent may be surmised
by comparing section 2-706 with two other sections of the Code.
First, consider section 2-712, which gives an aggrieved buyer the
right to cover and awards the buyer "the difference between the cost
of cover and the contract price together with any incidental or consequential damages as hereinafter defined (Section 2-715), but less
expenses saved in consequence of the seller's breach."21 Admittedly,
once again the reference is only to the contract price; however, under
the section which inventories a buyer's general remedies, a buyer
may be given cover damages "in addition to recovering so much of
those words should not also be given the construction suggested in the text when an
application of the Code language would overcompensate the aggrieved party. The
comments to the seller's remedies make specific reference to § 1-106. U.C.C. § 2-703,
comment 4.
20. Any argument that the seller's right of resale should be limited to cases in which
the buyer has paid nothing on the price should be rejected. The purpose of the right
of resale is to afford an aggrieved seller a commercially reasonable remedy which
eliminates the require~ent that market price be shown. In this sense the Code expands
the resale remedies of the Uniform Sales Act § 60. See Continental Copper & Steel
Indus., Inc. v. Bloom, 139 Conn. 700, 96 A.2d 758 (1953), with its emphasis on the
seller obtaining "the best prices available," and cases collected in Annot., 44 A.L.R.
296 (1926), supplemented in Annot., 119 A.L.R. 1141 (1939). The Code's purpose of
providing a commercially reasonable remedy is just as applicable when the buyer has
paid a part of the price as when all of the purchase price is still due.
21. u.c.c. § 2-712(2).
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the price as has been paid."22 Thus, the buyer's cover remedy takes
specific account of any prepayments on the contract price. Although
there is no similar provision in the sections governing seller's remedies, it may be that the general damage formula for the seller who
has resold under section 2-706 was patterned after the buyer's cover
remedy provided in section 2-712 without recalling that, with respect
to the buyer's remedy, amounts prepaid on the contract price had
been dealt with in another section of the Code.23
Second, compare section 2-706 with section 2-708 which states the
measure of recovery for a seller who has not elected to pursue the
resale remedy. The measure of damages provided in section 2-708
is "the difference between the market price at the time and place for
tender and the unpaid contract price together with any incidental
damages provided in this Article (Section 2-710), but less expenses
saved in consequence of the buyer's breach."24 This formula parallels
that found in section 2-706, although market price is substituted for
resale price because the safeguards of cover have not been met.25 Outside of this understandable change, the only difference between the
measures of recovery found in sections 2-706 and 2-708 is the addition of the word ''unpaid" in the latter section. Does this addition
indicate an intention that the two sections should produce different
results when the seller resold the goods for their market price under
section 2-706 and when he did not resell but rather sought recovery
under the general damage formula of section 2-708? The primary
purpose for including the right to "cover" (both a buyer's right to
cover and a seller's right to resell) was to give the aggrieved party a
remedy more consistent with commercial practice and to simplify recoveries by not requiring detailed proof of market prites.26 Thus,
22. Section 2-711. Buyer's Remedies in General; Buyer's Security Interest in Rejected
Goods.
(1) Where the seller fails to make delivery or repudiates or the buyer rightfully
rejects or justifiably revokes acceptance then with respect to any goods involved, and
with respect to the whole if the breach goes to the whole contract (Section 2-612),
the buyer may cancel and whether or not he has done so may in addition to
recovering so much of the price as has been paid
(a) "cover" and have damages under the next section as to all the goods affected
whether or not they have been identified to the contract ••••
23. Comment 1 to § 2-712 (the section giving the buyer the right to cover) states:
"This section provides the buyer with a remedy aimed at enabling him to obtain the
goods he needs thus meeting his essential need. This remedy is the buyer's equivalent
of the seller's right to resell."
24. u.c.c. § 2-708(1).
25. As to whether a seller who has resold has the option of pursuing damages under
§ 2-708, see Peters, supra note 7, at 257-61; cf. Sloss-Sheffield Steel &: Iron Co. v. Stover
Mfg.&: Engine Co., 37 F.2d 876 (7th Cir. 1929). The privilege of using § 2-708(2) following a resale is expressly recognized by that subsection.
26. 1 HAWKLAND, A TRANSACIIONAL GUIDE TO THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 273-83
(1964).
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except for the omission of the word "unpaid" in section 2-706, there
is no reason to believe that the Code envisions different measures of
recovery under sections 2-706 and 2-708 when the seller has resold
the goods for their market price. The word "unpaid" should therefore be read into section 2-706(1) so that, in a suit by Seller in Case
Four, the damage formula would consider only the unpaid contract
price.27
Should courts conclude that the proper formula to be applied
under section 2-706(1) ought always to begin with the resale price
minus the unpaid contract price? Certainly such a conclusion would
not affect the results in those cases in which the buyer has made no
prepayments (Cases One through Three); it would make section
2-706 parallel to section 2-708 and equivalent to the buyer's cover
remedy; and, most important, the Code philosophy of compensation
would be promoted by this conclusion. However, generalizations
cause difficulties when facts get in their way. Consider the following
variation on the Basic Fact Pattern.
CASE FIVE

Prior to breach Buyer prepaid $2,000 on the $5,000 purchase
price. Thus, at the time of Buyer's breach, Buyer owed Seller
only $3,000 for the goods. Seller resold the goods for $4,500incurring no incidental damages and saving no expenses because
of the breach by Buyer.
Case Five differs from Case Four only in the amount of the down
payment-the $500 of Case Four has been increased to $2,000. Once
again this fact pattern falls into the not-so-usual category, since buyers who owe less than the goods are worth do not often breach.
Nevertheless, as mentioned above, it is not a satisfactory answer to
Case Five Buyer that his situation does not occur very often and that
therefore it must be treated like the more common situation, even
27. Section 64 of the Uniform Sales Act contained the following formula for damages
when the buyer wrongfully neglected or refused to accept and pay for the goods: "the
difference between the contract price and the market or current price .••." In commenting on this section, Williston stated:
But the essential element of damages is conveniently expressed by the formulathe difference between the contract price, that is, the amount of the obligation
which the buyer failed to fulfil, and the market price, that is, the value of the goods
which the seller has left upon his hands.
3 WILLISTON, SALES § 582 (rev. ed. 1948). Notice how Williston suggests that the contract
price should be read as the amount of the obligation "which the buyer failed to fulfil."
Is this another way of saying unpaid contract price?
U.C.C. § 2-718, discussed in the text accompanying notes 33-42 infra, does not support
Case Four Seller's claim for $500 in damages. Section 2-718 deals with a buyer's right to
restitution; it does not express a policy of awarding sellers up to $500 more than their
damages.
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though the result may be unjust. Yet this is what the seemingly inflexible formula of section 2-706 does: If the resale conditions of that
section are met, subsection (I) would allow Seller to recover from
Buyer the difference between the resale and contract prices-or an
additional $500. Thus, Seller would have received $4,500 on resale,
$2,000 from Buyer's down payment, and $500 damages-a total of
$7,000 on a $5,000 contract. An attempt to use section 2-706 in this
manner ought to be rejected for the reasons suggested above in the
discussion of Case Four.
If this were the only Code problem presented by Case Five, there
would have been little reason to include it, for it would have been
only a more glaring example of the possibility of using section 2-706
to penalize a defaulting buyer. Case Five was included because its
larger down payment brings into consideration another section of
the Code (section 2-718)-a section whose philosophy is other than
that of only compensating the aggrieved party.28 In Case Five, Buyer
paid a substantial sum of money and received nothing in return,
except perhaps the pleasure of having entered into a contractual relation. Since Buyer has paid more than the amount by which the goods
have declined in value, Buyer may desire a return of as much of the
$2,000 down payment as he can secure. Such a claim is foreign to a
fault-minded legal system because it presents a party in substantial
default attempting to recover from one who has committed no
breach of contract. Seller is not at "fault" and therefore, if Buyer is
to recover, such recovery must rest on the idea of preventing even a
non-breacher from gaining an unjust enrichment at the expense of
the breaching party.29
The majority of common-law cases refused to grant the defaulting buyer any relief, 30 and the courts often supported their decisions
28. U.C.C. §§ 2-718(2) and (3) are quoted in the text following note 32 infra.
29. Disgorging unjust enrichments is the goal of a series of ideas loosely grouped
under the heading of restitution. The policy underlying the statement in the text is
summarized in REsrATEMENT, REsrrrunoN § 1 (1937): "A person who has been unjustly
enriched at the expense of another is required to make restitution to the other." The
same principle can be traced back to DIGEST OF JusrINIAN Book 12, tit. 6, para. 14: "For
this by nature is equitable, that no one be made richer through another's loss." See
DAWSON, UNJUSf ENRICHMENT: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 3 (1951).
30. Atalah v. Wilson Lewith Mach. Corp., 200 F.2d 297 (4th Cir. 1952); Tomboy
Gold 8: Copper Co. v. Marks, 185 Cal. 336, 197 Pac. 94 (1921) ("No rule is more firmly
settled'); Noel v. Dumont Builders, Inc., 178 Cal. App. 2d 691, 3 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1960);
Thach v. Durham, 120 Colo. 253, 208 P .2d 1159 (1949) (But cf. Perino v. Jarvis, 1!15
Colo. 393, 312 P.2d 108 (1957). ); Foss-Hughes Co. v. Norman, 32 Del. 108, 119 Atl. 854
(1923); Reitano v. Fote, 50 So. 2d 873 (Fla. 1951); Cobb v. Library Bureau, 268 Mass.
311, 167 N.E. 765 (1929); Notti v. Clark, 133 Mont. 263, 322 P.2d 112 (1958); Ellinghouse
v. Hansen Packing Co., 66 Mont. 444, 213 Pac. 1087 (192!1); Babbitt v. Wides Motor
Sales Corp., 17 Misc. 2d 889, 192 N.Y.S.2d 21 (App. T. 1959); Dluge v. Whiteson, 292
Pa. 334, 141 Atl. 230 (1928); Neis v. O'Brien, 12 Wash. 358, 41 Pac. 59 (1895).
Not all cases denied recovery to the defaulting buyer. Indeed, there was substantial
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with colorful phrases about the impact which an allowance of restitution would have on the commercial world. 31 In these jurisdictions,
neither Seller nor Buyer in Case Five would have been allowed any
recovery and Seller would have "netted" $6,500 on the $5,000 contract.32 The Code, however, has taken a partial step in favor of the
defaulting buyer. Section 2-718 of the Code approves agreements
which provide for liquidated damages and then provides:
(2) Where the seller justifiably withholds delivery of goods because of the buyer's breach, the buyer is entitled to restitution of
any amount by which the sum of his payments exceeds
(a) the amount to which the seller is entitled by virtue of terms
liquidating the seller's damages in accordance with subsection (1 ), or
(b) in the absence of such terms, twenty per cent of the value of
the total performance for which the buyer is obligated under
the contract or $500, whichever is smaller.
(3) The buyer's right to restitution under subsection (2) is subject to offset to the extent that the seller establishes
(a) a right to recover damages under the provisions of this
Article other than subsection (1), and
(b) the amount or value of any benefits received by the buyer
directly or indirectly by reason of the contract.

Thus, the Code rejects the rule that a defaulting buyer has no
right to any restitution of his down payments/13 and to this extent
authority which allowed recovery for the amount of the benefits the buyer had conferred on the seller. Amtorg Trading Corp. v. Miehle Printing Press &: Mfg. Co., 206
F.2d 103 (2d Cir. 1953); Michigan Yacht &: Power Co. v. Busch, 143 Fed. 929, 934
(6th Cir. 1906) ("In justice the defendants have no right to more of this money than
will compensate them against loss by reason of plaintiff's conduct'); Cherry Valley
Iron Works v. Florence Iron River Co., 64 Fed. 569 (6th Cir. 1894); McCrea v. Ford,
24 Colo. App. 506, 135 Pac. 465 (1913); Sabas v. Gregory, 91 Conn. 26, 98 Atl. 293
(1916); Hickock v. Hoyt, 33 Conn. 553 (1866); Wonder Prods., Inc. v. Blake, 330 Mich.
159, 47 N.W.2d 61, cert. denied, 342 U.S. 850 (1951); Humphrey v. Sagouspe, 50 Nev.
157, 254 Pac. 1074 (1927); Bryant v. Pennington, 346 S.W.2d 367 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961);
Breding v. Champlain Marine &: Realty Co., 106 Vt. 288, 172 Atl. 625 (1934); Stewart
v. Moss, 30 Wash. 2d 535, 192 P.2d 362 (1948).
Nonetheless, cases stating that recovery would be denied to a defaulting buyer
were probably in the majority. 3 WlLLISfoN, SALES § 599m (rev. ed. 1948); WOODWARD,
LAW OF QUASI CONTRACTS § 177 (1913); Corman, supra note 8; Talbot, Restitution for
the Defaulting Buyer, 9 W. REs. L. REv. 445 (1958); cases collected in Annot., II
A.L.R.2d 701 (1950).
31. See, e.g., Dluge v. Whiteson, 292 Pa. 334, 141 Atl. 230 (1928).
32. U.C.C. § 2-706(6), which allows a seller to retain any "profit" made on the
resale, does not express a policy of allowing the seller to retain the down payment
when the down payment plus the proceeds of the resale exceed the contract price.
See U.C.C. § 2-718.
33. Cf. Procter &: Gamble Distrib. Co. v. Lawrence Am. Field Warehousing Corp.,
16 N.Y.2d 344, 213 N.E.2d 873, 266 N.Y.S.2d 785 (1965). U.C.C. § 2-718 parallels N.Y.
PERS. PROP. I.Aw§ 145(a) (McKinney 1962). New York was one of the states which had
denied restitution recovery to the defaulting buyer. NEW YORK I.Aw REv. CoMM'N
REPORT 234 (1942). New York law drew a distinction between payments on the price

1310

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 65:1299

section 2-718 strengthens the philosophy that an aggrieved seller is
entitled only to compensation. However, the compensation principle
is partially lost in the limitation which is placed on a buyer's right:
A defaulting buyer is not entitled to recover all of his prepayments
(less seller's damages); nor does he recover the amount of his seller's
benefit.34 A buyer's basic right to restitution is a right to recover the
amount by which his payments exceed a stated minimum-a minimum which varies depending upon the value of the buyer's total
contract obligations, but which never exceeds $500. Therefore, in
situations like Case Five, there is a Code philosophy to allow Seller
(in Buyer's suit for restitution) to retain $500 without a showing of
damages.35 This philosophy is contrary to the compensation principle and, as will be demonstrated, makes a solution to Case Five
difficult.
Suppose Case Five Buyer seeks restitution under section 2-718.
His basic right is detailed in section 2-718(2), which is quoted above.
Since the contract price is $5,000 and since twenty per cent of $5,000
exceeds the $500 maximum, Buyer is entitled to restitution of $1,500
-that is, the $2,000 down payment less the statutory maximum of
$500. However, section 2-718(3) adds that the "buyer's right to restitution under subsection (2)" is subject to offset by the amount of
Seller's damages. It is at this point that the restitution remedy of
section 2-718 does not easily mesh with the two principal sections on
seller's damages. The problems thus created may be illustrated by
the following three situations.

Situation A
Assume that Seller in Case Five had not complied with the requirements of section 2-706 when he resold, that he therefore was
not entitled to recover the difference between the resale and conand deposits given as security. The latter could be recovered. Annot., 11 A.L.R.2d 701,
713-17 (1950). U.C.C. § 2·718, comment 2, rejects this distinction.
34. He would have recovered the amount of the seller's benefit in those states which,
prior to the Code, allowed recovery to the defaulting buyer. Foster v. Warner, 42 Idaho
729, 249 Pac. 771 (1926).
35. Perhaps the philosophy of allowing the non-defaulting seller to retain up to
$500 of down payments reflects a belief that, upon a buyer's breach of contract, a
seller has damages which are difficult to measure-especially when the contract is small
and the down payment minimal. Thus, the seller can retain the Code minimum without proving damages. However, on seller's breach of contract, the buyer does not
receive similar favorable treatment. If he has accepted non-conforming goods, the buyer
must pay the price, U .C.C. § 2-607, and can reduce recovery by proving his damages,
U.C.C. § 2-714, but he cannot retain up to $500 worth of the goods without paying
for them. The difference between the Code treatment given sellers and buyers may
be explained in part by the pre-Code law. Corman, supra note 7.
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tract prices, and that a court would find that the market price of the
goods was at least $5,000, even though Seller resold for $4,500. Buyer's failure to pay the remaining $3,000 on the contract price has
caused Seller no damage (since there is no difference between the
contract and market prices)36 and, therefore, under section 2-718(2),
Buyer ought to recover $1,500-the $2,000 down payment less the
$500 deduction. Thus, Seller's net financial position would have
been at least $5,500, since he could have kept the goods (worth at
least $5,000) and, under section 2-718, $500 of Buyer's down payment. Such a case is not difficult to solve under the Code, even
though there may be disagreement with the policy underlying the
legislative decision which allows a seller to retain up to $500 without a showing of injury.

Situation B
Assume again that Seller in Case Five had not complied with the
resale requirements of section 2-706, but that a court would find that
the market price of those goods was $4,500. Seller's damages would
be measured by section 2-708(1): unpaid contract price less market
price. Thus, if Buyer had made no down payment in Case Five,
Seller would have been entitled to $500 in damages ($5,000-the unpaid contract price-less $4,500-the market price). However, Case
Five assumes that Buyer made a substantial down payment prior to
his default and therefore it is necessary to consider the effect which
such a down payment has on a determination of Seller's damages.
First, having made a down payment, Buyer is placed in the position of having to initiate court action since Seller undoubtedly
would be most willing to leave matters just where they are: he has
$2,000 from Buyer and $4,500 on the resale-a total of $6,500 from
a $5,000 contract~ The defaulting Buyer must therefore bear the
uncertainties involved in attempting to change this status quo by
means of an action for restitution under section 2-718 which allows
the non-defaulting Seller to retain $500 of the down payment without any showing of injury. Second, the $2,000 down payment and
the resulting restitution action require Seller to establish his damages as an offset to Buyer's right of recovery. Since it has been assumed in Situation B that the "cover" formula of section 2-706 is not
available, those damages must be measured under section 2-708(1)
86. This article assumes that § 2-708(1) is applied to determine the seller's damages.
See text at note 24 supra. I£ subsection (2) is applicable, see note 7 supra, the measure
and amount of seller's damages may change; however, the approach to buyer's restitu•
tion recovery would be the same. Section 2-708(1) was used in the text because of its
similarity to the damage formula when the seller has elected resale under § 2-706.
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and would be zero because the unpaid contract price ($3,000) is less
than the market price ($4,500) of the goods. 37 Therefore, a literal
application of the language of sections 2-718(3) and 2-708(1) would
allow Buyer to recover $1,500-the same amount he recovered in
Situation A. Such a result compensates Seller for his loss since, after
default, Seller has goods worth $4,500 and a right to retain $500 of
the down payment, but it ignores the philosophy of section 3-718(2)
which allows a non-defaulting seller to retain up to $500 of a down
payment without a showing of damages.38
That there is an inconsistency between these two parts of the
Code is not surprising; a philosophy of compensation and a philosophy of penalizing the defaulting party are difficult to assimilate.
Courts can, if they desire, use section 2-708 as it was used in the
preceding paragraph to limit substantially the scope of the statutory
deduction from the defaulting buyer's restitution recovery. Urging
such a Code construction is tempting, but it too patently ignores the
express purpose of section 2-718. There are several possible methods
of giving effect to this purpose under facts like those in Case Five
when Seller is relying on section 2-708 to measure his damages. 30
One method would be to hold that a buyer's "right to restitution"
which is subject to offset under section 2-718(3) means the buyer's
right to his down payment and not to his down payment less the
statutory deduction, as has been assumed up to this point. Thus,
from the down payment ($2,000)-which it is assumed is being returned-would be subtracted the section 2-708 damages of $500
[since the restitution payment ($2,000) increases the unpaid contract
price from $3,000 to $5,000, the damages (unpaid contract price less
market price) are $500]; from this difference would then be deducted
37. This result follows even though the money returned to Buyer is considered as
increasing the "unpaid contract price" for the purpose of § 2-708(l)'s damage formula.
If $1,500 must be returned pursuant to § 2-718, the unpaid contract price would still
be $4,500. Since the goods are worth $4,500, the UCC § 2-708(1) formula produces no
damages to be offset against Buyer's restitution recovery.
38. These same problems arise whenever the goods are worth less than the contract
price, but more than the amount still due oi;i the contract price. For example, if the
goods in Case Five had a market price of $3,800 (assume no resale for $4,500), the
analysis in the text would give Buyer a right to restitution of $1,500 ($2,000 down
payment less the• $500 maximum). Under § 2-718(3), Seller could offset damages of
$700 since the "unpaid contract price" under U.C.C. § 2-708(1) would be increased to
$4,500. See note 37 supra. Buyer's net recovery would be $800 and Seller would have
goods worth $3,800 and a right to retain $1,200 of the down payment. Seller has thus
"lost" the statutory $500 deduction allowed by § 2-718(2).
39. In cases where the purchase price and the down payment substantially exceed
the $500 limit in § 2-718, it is possible that neither the court nor the parties will
consider carefully how the $500 ought to be handled. See Procter &: Gamble Distrib.
Co. v. Lawrence Am. Field Warehousing Corp., 16 N.Y.2d 344, 213 N.E.2d 873, 266
N.Y.S.2d 785 (1965).
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the statutory nventy per cent or $500, whichever is smaller. Such a
construction would permit Buyer to recover $1,000 and would leave
Seller with goods worth $4,500, $500 as damages, and $500 as
the statutory penalty awarded when a buyer breaches after having
made a substantial down payment. Another method of reaching the
same result would be to ignore the word "unpaid" in section 2-708(1)
in those cases in which a defaulting buyer is seeking restitution. This
construction would give Seller $500 in damages (contract price minus
market price) to be deducted from Buyer's right to restitution of
$1,500. Although such a construction makes no sense if the purpose
of Code damages is to award compensation and only compensation,
nevertheless this approach is consistent with the philosophy of section 2-718 and, since Buyer must rely on that section for his recovery,
its philosophy ought to control.40

Situation C
Finally, assume Case Five Seller had complied with the resale
requirements of section 2-706. Buyer's right to $1,500 in restitution
would then be subject to Seller's damages-presumably measured
by section 2-706(1). A literal application of that section's formula
would give Seller $500 in damages (contract price minus resale
price), even though he resold for more than the unpaid balance.
Buyer's restitution award would thus be $1,000 and Seller would
have a net recovery of $5,500. The apparent policy of section 2-718(2)
has been satisfied and it has been satisfied without the difficulties experienced in working with section 2-708, which does include the word
"unpaid" in setting forth the damage formula. In short, the restitution philosophy of the Code is more easily served by the contract
minus resale price formula of section 2-706 than by the awkward
handling of the word "unpaid" when it appears in section 2-708.
Thus, any confident suggestion that the formula in section
2-706(1) should be judicially rewritten for all cases so as to consider
the amounts a buyer has paid toward the contract price must be
40. This result is reached with reluctance. A defaulting buyer ought to be able
to recover the net benefits which his partial performance has given the seller. Unless
ideas supporting punitive damages have intervened and except for those cases where
the defaulting party has received a benefit from the non-defaulter's performance, the
law should require compensation-but no more than compensation. Palmer, The
Contract Price as a Limit on Restitution for Defendant's Breach, 20 Omo ST. L.J. 264
(1959). Those courts which agree with this philosophy, see cases cited in note 30 supra,
can read § 2-718 so that the $500 is a part of the unpaid contract price; thus, the
offset by the seller will be correspondingly reduced. However, the Code purpose to
award a seller up to $500 in addition to his damages-when sued by a defaulting
buyer-seems clear. See generally 5A CORBIN, CONTRACTS §§ 1122-35 (1964).
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tempered by the supposed policy of section 2-718. Perhaps this much
can be said: as long as a seller is using section 2-706 to recover what
he claims are his damages after resale, the formula should begin with
the unpaid contract price. On the other hand, when the breaching
buyer is the moving party seeking restitution of his prepayments, the
historical reluctance of courts to come to the aid of the defaulter
may cause those courts to apply section 2-706's formula literally and
to remake section 2-708(1) so as to eliminate the word "unpaid."
Indeed, the Code itself promotes such a policy in this situation. This
construction will diminish the buyer's section 2-718 recovery and
perhaps "teach him a lesson" for breaching his contract41-a lesson
which is entirely unneeded because, by hypothesis, these are contracts where the buyer owes less than the goods are worth.
CONCLUSION

The Code has given both the buyer and the seller-on the default of the other-a privilege to cover, by either buying or selling
on the market. When certain safeguards are followed, damages are
computed from the cover price. The seller's measure of damages is
detailed in section 2-706(1), but that section ignores payments made
by the buyer prior to his breach. This omission will cause difficulties
until the statute is judicially construed in enough cases to present a
pattern for predicting future results.
This article does not argue that the buyer should not be made to
compensate the seller for the buyer's breach. On the contrary, compensation should be the foundation of contract damages. However,
no more than compensation should be required of the buyer. The
Code's rules of damages, and especially the measure included in section 2-706(1), must be applied with the same judicial understanding
as is required in applying any sweeping rule of law. The purposes
underlying the rule must be sought out and the results in the particular case measured against those purposes.
41. Neis v. O'Brien, 12 Wash. 358, 41 Pac. 59 (1895).

